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TH1E LIVING HAND OF THE PAST: HISTORY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE
Christopher L. Eisgruber*
INTRODUCTION
J like much of what Jack Rakove has to say about fidelity to history,
and I like his fine book, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the
Making of the Constitution,' even better. I am not persuaded by his
comments on the internal logic of originalism, but that is principally
because I have never heard a coherent justification for originalism,
and so do not have any way to tell what counts as a better or worse
version of originalism. I do not propose to pursue that point here.2
Instead, given that Professor Rakove is almost as skeptical about
originalism as I am,3 I would like to focus my remarks upon the
broader topic of our panel, "Fidelity to the Constitution Through
History."
My basic claim is this: History has a useful role to play in constitu-
tional interpretation, but not, as is often thought, at the expense of our
commitment to moral principle or justice. History should figure in
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. For helpful conversa-
tions in connection with this project, I am grateful to Martin Flaherty, Jim Fleming,
Larry Kramer, Ricky Revesz, and Larry Sager, as well as to participants in the Sym-
posium on Fidelity in Constitutional Theory at Fordham University School of Law
and a faculty workshop at the Hofstra Law School. I would also like to thank the
Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Faculty Research Fund, which provided
generous financial support for this research.
1. Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the
Constitution (1996) [hereinafter Rakove, Original Meanings].
2. I have set out my views about originalism and Professor Rakove's book else-
where. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Early Interpretations and Original Sins, 95 Mich. L
Rev. (forthcoming May 1997) (book review).
3. Professor Rakove's most radical critique of originalism appears in a footnote
to Original Meanings, where he writes:
I am often asked whether I think originalism offers a viable or valid theory
of constitutional interpretation. My preferred answer is, I hope, suitably am-
bivalent. In the abstract, I think that originalism is vulnerable to two power-
ful criticisms. First, it is always in some fundamental sense anti-democratic,
in that it seeks to subordinate the judgment of present generations to the
wisdom of their distant (political) ancestors. Second, the real problems of
reconstructing coherent intentions and understandings from the evidence of
history raise serious questions about the capacity of originalist forays to yield
the definitive conclusions that the advocates of this theory claim to find. On
the other hand, I happen to like originalist arguments when the weight of the
evidence seems to support the constitutional outcomes I favor--and that
may be as good a clue to the appeal of originalism as any other.
Rakove, Original Meanings, supra note 1, at xv n.*; see also Jack N. Rakove, Fidelity
Through History (Or to It), 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1587, 1609 (1997) [hereinafter
Rakove, Fidelity Through History] ("[O]riginalism ultimately fails because it is false
to the history it purports to describe.").
1611
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
constitutional interpretation as an aid to the pursuit of justice, not a
constraint upon it. "Fidelity through history," in short, is a defensible
conception of constitutional interpretation only if history enlists in the
service of justice.
I. THE FIDELITY PROBLEM
I begin by offering a characterization of the "fidelity problem."
There is a long-running debate among constitutional interpreters
about the extent to which constitutional meaning depends upon polit-
ical theory. The "fidelity problem" requires constitutional interpret-
ers to identify how, and to what extent, they must sacrifice ideal
political theory in favor of historical fact.
Everybody believes that constitutional interpretation must differ
from pure political theory. Were that not so, making and amending a
constitution would be a sham. Public officials, including judges, would
simply consult their best judgments about justice, exactly as they
might do in the absence of a written constitution. If the Constitution
matters at all, then constitutional interpretation, unlike political the-
ory, must resolve some issues by reference to historical fact. More
specifically, it must resolve them on the basis of the fact that particular
words were drafted and ratified.
Argument about the "fidelity problem" occasionally proceeds as
though the distinction between constitutional interpretation and polit-
ical theory were in jeopardy. To my knowledge, no scholar, judge, or
lawyer has ever come close to erasing that distinction. For example,
as a matter of abstract political theory, the relative merits of the par-
liamentary and presidential systems are highly contestable. The Con-
stitution, however, specifies presidential government. I do not know
of any constitutional theorist who has ever doubted this fact about the
Constitution (although I do know some who wished it were other-
wise),4 nor do I know of any constitutional theory so wild that it
would, even in principle, permit anybody to argue that the nation's
chief executive officer must command a legislative majority.
So one solution to the "fidelity problem" would be this: No matter
what your views about political theory, your interpretation of the
Constitution must respect any rule explicitly stated in the constitu-
tional text. The United States has presidential government even if
you think parliamentary government would be better. Supreme Court
Justices have life tenure, even if you think it would be better (as I do)
were they required to retire after serving a limited term.5 Federal
4. See, e.g., Lloyd Cutler, To Form a Government, Foreign Aff., Fall 1980, at 126,
126-27 (arguing that the structure of our Constitution prevents us from forming an
effective government).
5. See L.H. Larue, "Neither Force nor Will," 12 Const. Commentary 179, 179(1995) (criticizing life tenure for Justices as the stupidest feature of the Constitution);
L.A. Powe, Jr., Old People and Good Behavior, 12 Const. Commentary 195, 195-96
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courts must preserve the right to a jury trial in all common law actions
even if you think (as I do) that this right is often pointless and ineffi-
cient. And so on.
If this simple solution to the "fidelity problem" were acceptable to
most people, I dare say this Symposium would never have taken place.
Constitutional interpreters would still have much to debate, of course.
They would, for example, have to argue about what principles were
recommended by political theory and whether judges should have a
large role to play in enforcing those principles. Conceptions of fidelity
would, however, have little to say about these debates. People might
defend liberal or conservative views, and they might favor or oppose
judicial activism, but, whatever their views, they would have to defend
their position on the ground that it served the interests of justice
rather than on the ground that it was especially faithful to the
Constitution.
The simple solution to the fidelity problem is unacceptable to many,
if not most, people who write about the Constitution. They believe
that constitutionalism requires us to take a deeper discount from
political theory in favor of history. Why is that belief so common?
II. Ti DEAD HAND FALLACY
The answer to that question lies with two common fallacies. The
first of these, which I believe to be the central and most damaging
fallacy of modem constitutional theory, I shall refer to as the "Dead
Hand Fallacy." The Dead Hand Fallacy holds that the purpose of the
Constitution is to subordinate present-day politics to the will of past
super-majorities. In more florid terms, the point of the Constitution is
to empower the dead hand of the past. This result is sometimes justi-
fied by reference to ideas about popular sovereignty, which I find ex-
ceedingly odd, since the people who made the Constitution's most
important provisions are all dead. Others treat the Dead Hand Fal-
lacy as though it were an axiomatic fact about the Constitution, per-
haps incapable of justification but indispensable to constitutional
interpretation.
Adherents of the Dead Hand Fallacy believe that our obligation to
honor specific constitutional provisions-such as those creating an in-
dependent president or life tenure for judges or the right to a jury trial
in common law civil cases-is in service of a more general obligation
to yield to the will of past super-majorities. If in fact this more general
obligation exists, then it is not obvious that we exhaust it merely by
respecting what the Constitution says. Respect for explicit constitu-
tional rules might be nothing more than the first step toward meeting
a larger obligation to dead super-majorities, an obligation which we
(1995) (stating that life tenure for Justices was more appropriate at the Founding than
it is today). Powe proposes eighteen-year terms. kd. at 197.
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discharge fully only if we also respect their intentions or expectations
or practices or ideologies. Solving the "fidelity problem" thus re-
quires adherents of the Dead Hand Fallacy to develop a theory that
describes the appropriate balance between deference to the past and
regard for the present. Not surprisingly, this task turns out to be very
difficult, if not impossible, for the simple reason that it is hard to think
of any good reason for empowering dead people in the first place.
Once you admit that the dead should have some power over the liv-
ing, it is exceedingly hard to say how much power is enough. Con-
ceived pursuant to the Dead Hand Fallacy, the "fidelity problem" is
intractable indeed, and hence meet for clever ideas about translation,
synthesis, and what not.
The Dead Hand Fallacy gets constitutionalism backwards. The pur-
pose of constitutionalism, I want to suggest, is to discipline the present
in order to enable future people to govern in the interests of justice-
not to harness present-day people to protect the values of the past.
This idea will be counterintuitive to many readers. The key to my
suggestion is to imagine what American politics would be like in the
absence of a written constitution-or, more precisely, in the absence
of the super-majoritarian barriers to amendment imposed by Article
V. Adherents of the Dead Hand Fallacy suppose that under such cir-
cumstances present-day people would be free to govern themselves
unfettered by the past. Not so: A nation's history inevitably defines
the choices available to it.
To begin with, any change will involve, as the economists say,
"transaction costs." Major reforms frustrate settled expectations and
disrupt learned patterns of behavior. New institutions require people
to test and develop strategies of political cooperation and to overcome
opposition from dissident bureaucrats who wish the old institutions
were still in place.
But the "presence of the past," as Sheldon Wolin has called it,6 runs
far deeper than these obvious, albeit substantial, "transaction costs."
First, when a nation debates institutional reform, certain people will
be in power and others will be marginal. Who speaks how in the de-
bate about a nation's next government will depend upon the composi-
tion of its present one. Some people will have the right to vote and
others will not; some people will have prestigious titles, like "Senator"
or "President," or resources, such as the power to reward their allies
with desirable jobs, and others will not. Second, even if people agree
that the existing system of government is inefficient or unjust, they
may find it impossible to form a coalition in favor of any particular
alternative. It is thus possible that no reform will occur even when
everybody thinks the "transaction costs" are worth bearing. Third,
6. Sheldon S. Wolin, The Presence of the Past: Essays on the State and the Con-
stitution (1989).
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the existing system of government will affect citizens' ability to ana-
lyze alternative political schemes: It will determine what information
they have (about how institutions work and what people think); it will
determine what problems occupy their attention (those that loomed
largest in the existing system); and it may even determine what values
and interests people have.
Whether we have a written, obdurate constitution or not, we inherit
our politics from the past; no people writes upon a blank slate. In the
extraordinary moments when radical reform occurs, those who re-
make political institutions inevitably define the options available to
their successors. We must therefore ask the following question: What
would a constitution maker do if she (1) realized that her decisions
would inevitably shape the political context of those who followed her
and (2) wished to enable her successors to govern as freely as
possible?
I submit that such a constitution maker would have at least three
ambitions. First, she would want to avoid congesting political choice
unnecessarily. As we have observed, any effort to specify political in-
stitutions will constrain the possibilities for subsequent political ac-
tion, but some systems of government are more flexible than others.
Second, she would want to make sure that the institutions which she
and her contemporaries designed were good ones suited to long-term
interests. To the extent possible, the influence of the past should be
an aid, rather than a hindrance, in the future. Third, she would want
to facilitate self-conscious reflection about what was fixed by the past,
what was up for grabs in the present, and whether substantial reform
was desirable. She would, in other words, be concerned not only
about the successful design of the nation's political institutions, but
about long-term maintenance and repair of the constitutional system.
The first of these three objectives might lead one to believe that the
best constitution is the most easily amendable: Article V's stiff re-
quirements reduce the range of choices available to present-day ma-
jorities. But that tempting conclusion ignores the crucial fact that, as
we have just seen, formal constitutional barriers to change are not the
only ones or even the most important ones. Lower thresholds for con-
stitutional legislation may induce people to constitutionalize a greater
range of policies and decisions, and so to constrict the range of choices
available to later generations. Moreover, easy amendability may en-
courage imprudent choices, and so compromise the enlightened con-
stitution maker's second objective: to make sure the institutions she
creates are good ones, not only for her but for those who follow many
years after her.
My colleague and co-author Lawrence G. Sager has explained how
the counter-majoritarian features of Article V discipline constitution
makers to look beyond narrow and partisan political interests. He
points out that Article V insists upon geographic breadth, thereby re-
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ducing the chance that some proposal will become part of the Consti-
tution merely because it coincides with the interests of one narrow
slice of the country. And he argues that because constitution makers
know their decisions will endure for many generations, they will have
an incentive to design institutions capable of accommodating changing
conceptions of justice and changing constellations of interest.7 Article
V's formal barriers to change, in other words, remind constitution
makers of a fact that would be true (but which they might not recog-
nize) even in the absence of such barriers: Errors they make will
haunt their children's children because a people inevitably inherits its
politics from its past.
Sager calls his account of the Constitution "justice-seeking."8 It in-
terprets the Constitution's obduracy as a mechanism for getting good
political institutions, not as a device for empowering transient super-
majorities to impose their will on future citizens. Anybody who
doubts the importance of the incentives Sager describes need only
contemplate the circus that recurs every ten years when state legisla-
tures reapportion congressional districts in the wake of new census
data. Here is institutional reform conducted at regular intervals pur-
suant to majoritarian rules, and it is a shameful pageant of partisan
self-interest. State lawmakers carve safe districts for incumbents and
maximize their party's power to the extent permissible under constitu-
tional and statutory constraints.9 Partisanship is, of course, never ab-
sent from politics, constitutional or otherwise, but it dominates more
in some circumstances than in others. One wonders, would legislators
meet the challenge of reapportionment more responsibly if forced to
develop principles that could be applied many years into the future or
in other states?
My proposal, in sum, is this: The Constitution's purpose is not to
empower the past but, first, to enable the present to deal with the
inevitable influence of the past, and, second, to discipline the present
to take into account the interests of the future. A written, obdurate
Constitution is best understood as an effort (1) to entrench only fun-
damental political decisions, (2) to facilitate self-conscious and effec-
tive design of fundamental political institutions, and (3) to facilitate
self-conscious and effective maintenance and reform of fundamental
political institutions.
One can, of course, argue about whether Americans would have
been better off if Article V had been less demanding. People might
7. Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893, 951-
53 (1990) [hereinafter Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution].
8. See Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410, 417 (1993). Sager also uses the term
"pragmatic-justice account" to describe his version of constitutional theory. Id. at 415.
9. For thoughtful discussion of the process, with recommendations for reform,
see Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of
Political Fairness, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1643, 1661-64 (1993).
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reasonably conclude that the costs imposed by Article V's rigidity out-
weigh whatever benefits flow from its effect upon the incentives of
constitutional decision makers. 10 Article V might, in other words, be
a defective mechanism for mixing flexibility with foresight in constitu-
tional reform. It might increase the weight of the dead hand of the
past even if its purpose is to do exactly the opposite. But that is irrele-
vant to our case against the Dead Hand Fallacy. My claim here is not
that the Constitution does a perfect job, or even a good job, of facili-
tating self-government in the present (although I do believe that it
does a good job). My claim, instead, is that the Constitution's purpose
is to facilitate self-government, not to empower the dead. Whether
the Constitution succeeds or fails at this enterprise is a different
question.
III. THE AESTHETIC FALLACY
The Dead Hand Fallacy is one source, but not the only source, of
constitutional theory's misplaced obsession with fidelity. The Dead
Hand Fallacy works in combination with a second fallacy, which I shall
refer to as the "Aesthetic Fallacy." People in the grip of this fallacy
suppose that the Constitution is like a poem, a symphony, or a great
work of political philosophy. Each word and every phrase must come
together to form a harmonious and pleasing composition. Interpret-
ers who accept the Aesthetic Fallacy believe that it is a grave error to
treat constitutional provisions as awkward or redundant. Interpreta-
tion demands humility: One must regard the Constitution as encoded
wisdom which yields up its secrets only to the most respectful readers.
There may be a connection between the Dead Hand Fallacy and the
Aesthetic Fallacy: If one imbues dead people with mystical power to
control the fate of their successors, it is reassuring and convenient to
believe that past generations consisted of great men who produced
perfect (or nearly perfect) laws." But this connection between the
two fallacies, if it exists at all, is practical rather than logical. One can
embrace the Aesthetic Fallacy even if one denies the Dead Hand Fal-
lacy. Indeed, although I have persistently criticized the Dead Hand
Fallacy,' 2 I count myself among those who have succumbed to the
10. Stephen Griffin, for example, has been especially critical of Article V. See, e.g.,
Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee Is ... Article V, 12 Const. Commentary 171, 171
(1995) (nominating Article V as the Constitution's stupidest provision). For a variety
of perspectives on Article V, see Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Prac-
tice of Constitutional Amendment 117-44 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
11. Cf. Bruce Ackerman, A Generation of Betrayal?, 65 Fordham L Rev. 1519,
1528 (1997) (describing people alive today as a "generation of midgets" with an obli-
gation to respect the achievements of their more distinguished forebears).
12. See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment's Constitution,
69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 47, 57-62 (1995) [hereinafter Eisgruber, Fourteenth Amendment]
(criticizing "contractual" conceptions of the Constitution).
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Aesthetic Fallacy. 13 I derive some solace from the fact that I have
considerable and diverse company. The Dworkinian value of integ-
rity, for example, can impel nonoriginalist interpreters of the Consti-
tution to look for hidden harmonies among its provisions. 4 Theorists
who would recoil from Straussian interpretations of, say, Machiavelli
or Aristotle do not hesitate to apply the principle of logocentric neces-
sity when reading the United States Constitution. 5
Though the Aesthetic Fallacy's influence has been widespread, it
quickly wilts when exposed to light. Jack Rakove's historical argu-
ments remind us of what should in any event have been obvious: The
Constitution is a practical political institution, fraught with compro-
mise and experimentation and human error, rather than a quasi-divine
artwork or philosophical composition. We dishonor neither the Con-
stitution nor the Framers if we regard some of its provisions as clumsy,
regrettable, or redundant. And much of the Constitution deserves ex-
actly that kind of treatment.
As an illustration, consider the Bill of Rights. Despite frequent and
cloying praise for the Bill, it is a disappointing work. The First
Amendment is very nice, of course. But, as Professor Levinson has
reminded us, the Second is embarrassing. 16 We might add that the
Third is obsolete; the Fifth contains the enigmatic Self-Incrimination
Clause' 7 and the potentially noxious Takings Clause; and the Seventh
13. See, e.g., id. at 62 (comparing the Constitution to a "Lockean treatise"); id. at
75-76 (defending the Constitution as a well-drafted credo). My arguments in this Re-
sponse provide a different explanation for the Constitution's purpose than the one I
endorsed in The Fourteenth Amendment's Constitution. Id. at 51-56 (describing the
"representative conception" of constitutionalism). I continue to adhere to much of
what I said in The Fourteenth Amendment's Constitution, including my critique of con-
tractual conceptions of the Constitution, id. at 57-62; my claim that the Fourteenth
Amendment had a transformative impact upon the Constitution as a whole, id. at 65-
74; and my critique of textual and common law "fetishes" in Supreme Court jurispru-
dence, id. at 75-103; however, I no longer subscribe to the "representative concep-
tion" of the Constitution.
14. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 165-67, 255 (1986) (discussing the de-
mands integrity makes upon the legal system); see also Ronald Dworkin, Taking
Rights Seriously 111 (1977) (discussing the "gravitational force" of a legal principle).
Fred Schauer's contribution to this Symposium also describes how Dworkinian ideas
about the "gravitational force" of a specific constitutional provision might cause it to
have more global implications. Frederick Schauer, Constitutional Invocations, 65
Fordham L. Rev. 1295, 1302-05 & n.36 (1997).
15. "Logocentric necessity" is the idea that an author did not make any mis-
takes-every word and every punctuation mark is precisely chosen and precisely
placed to express the author's meaning as perfectly as is possible. If one accepts the
idea of "logocentric necessity," then the best interpretation of a work is the one that
renders every word meaningful and every omission justified. For a presentation and
defense of the concept, see generally Jacob Klein, A Commentary on Plato's Meno
(1965).
16. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 Yale Li. 637,
658-59 (1989).
17. On the puzzles of the Self-Incrimination Clause, see Louis M. Seidman,
Rubashov's Question: Self-Incrimination and the Problem of Coerced Preferences, 2
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is imprudent. Missing are, among other things, the right to travel, the
right of parents to conduct the upbringing of their children, and, most
glaringly, any sort of equality right.' 8 Of course, to a society that ac-
commodated slavery these rights were more embarrassing than the
Second Amendment.
The problems with the American Bill of Rights are not merely a
matter of poor execution, however. When considered in light of the
purposes that justify having a written, obdurate constitution, the very
idea of a Bill of Rights begins to look distinctly odd. It should, by
now, be obvious why it makes sense to have a written Constitution
which decides, for example, whether we have a bicameral legislature
or a unicameral one, and how representation will be apportioned in
each house of Congress. Until these nuts-and-bolts issues are settled,
no government exists. 19 And once they are settled, it is foolish to pre-
tend that one can ever reconsider them on a blank slate. For example,
in debates about senatorial reform, some people who speak in the de-
bate will hold the title "Senator." Many citizens will have a vested
interest in seeing that their Senators retain power, and some people
will respect Senators because of the prestige that goes with the office.
With or without Article V, the Founders' decision to create a Senate
inevitably defines the parameters of our present-day political
debate. 0
But it is not so easy to see why it is necessary to include a Bill of
Rights in the Constitution. Some readers may consider my puzzle-
ment thick-headed: The point (the rather obvious point, they might
say) of having a Bill of Rights in the Constitution is to provide for
judicial protection of individual liberties. A Bill of Rights, however, is
not a necessary antecedent to a robust civil liberties jurisprudence.
One might simply include a provision saying, for example, that "The
judiciary shall have the power to declare void any government actions
inconsistent with the basic liberties of the people." Or, to avoid such
explicit endorsement of an active judicial role, the Constitution might
Yale J.L. & Human. 149, 151 (1990) (arguing that the Fifth Amendment puzzle is not
likely to be solved).
18. The Supreme Court found a right to travel implicit in the structure of the Con-
stitution before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S.
35 (1867). The Court used the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Bill of Rights, to
protect parental autonomy. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The Court generalized the Equal Protection Clause
through the rather inelegant logic of reverse incorporation. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497 (1954).
19. Sotirios A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means 50 (1984) [hereinafter
Barber, On What the Constitution Means].
20. Of course, Article V is especially limiting with respect to Senatorial reform: It
provides that "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in
the Senate." U.S. Const. art. V. I do not mean to argue that this extraordinary obsta-
cle is a desirable one. See supra p. 1617 (distinguishing between the purposes of the
Constitution and the question of whether the Constitution in fact serves those pur-
poses well).
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stipulate that "Neither the United States nor any of the States shall
take any action inconsistent with the basic liberties and fundamental
equality of the American people." Indeed, one might think that the
Fourteenth Amendment, which has been considerably more impor-
tant to civil rights jurisprudence than was the original Bill of Rights,
says something of this sort.2'
Other readers might think my puzzlement over the Bill of Rights
mistaken for a different reason. They might maintain that the point of
enumerating liberties is not to empower the judiciary but to confine it
within narrow limits. By articulating specific standards, they might
say, the Bill of Rights expresses distrust for judicial judgment and pro-
motes judicial restraint. This argument could work if indeed the
American Bill of Rights consisted of specific rules that left judges with
little discretion. Yet, even if we ignore the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments (and of course we cannot ignore them), that would be a
poor account of the Bill of Rights. Its provisions-the Free Speech
and Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, the Search and Seizure
Clauses of the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process and Takings
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment-articulate broad principles that
cannot be applied unless we trust the judiciary to make controversial
judgments about what values are worth protecting and what role
courts should play in protecting them. If one believes in judicial re-
straint, it makes sense to recommend that idea on its own terms, as an
interpretation of what political justice requires, rather than as the ob-
lique implication of a partial listing of abstract liberties.22
The Bill of Rights thus seems to congest political choice without
serving any justice-seeking purpose. More than most of the Constitu-
tion, it looks like an intrusion by the dead hand of the past, unnecessa-
rily subordinating the values of present-day Americans to archaic
judgments about guns, property, and juries. The deficiencies of the
Bill of Rights were ameliorated in principle by the Ninth Amendment
and in practice (to some extent) by the Fourteenth. In light of these
more general guarantees, one might hope that the specific items in the
Bill of Rights would serve only as supplements to the liberties recom-
mended by political justice-so that, for example, people like me, who
doubt the wisdom of jury trials in civil cases, would have to respect the
right created by the Seventh Amendment, and we might have to per-
21. On the importance of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Eisgruber, Fourteenth
Amendment, supra note 12, at 48 (arguing that "the Fourteenth Amendment changed
the Constitution from an ambiguously contractual law into a kind of law best de-
scribed by the representative concept of constitutionalism").
22. Nothing said in this Response rules out the possibility that the best interpreta-
tion of the United States Constitution would call for a very limited judicial role. My
argument is directed against the idea that "fidelity to the Constitution" requires us to
discount political justice more deeply than the text of the Constitution demands. On
some conceptions of political justice, however, fidelity to justice requires that the judi-
ciary abstain from deciding controversial issues of social policy and individual right.
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mit National Guardsmen to keep guns in their homes.3 We could
view the Bill of Rights as an awkward first step in a commendable
direction, eventually pursued more adeptly by the general language of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Judges and scholars have not, however, been satisfied to treat the
Bill of Rights in this way. They praise it as magnificent, not awkward,
and view it as limiting, not supplementing, the Constitution's more
abstract provisions. They contend, for example, that the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause protects only rights named in the
Bill of Rights. Forced to explain the point of including specific rights
in the constitutional text, they maintain that the list is designed to con-
strain judges by prohibiting them from acting upon their best practical
and moral judgments about what justice requires. This is the dead
hand of the past with a vengeance, valuing past practices and history
at the expense of not only justice but also the constitutional text
itself.24
IV. HISTORY, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RHETORIC
Judges and scholars should discard both the Dead Hand Fallacy and
the Aesthetic Fallacy. Our obligation to respect the past is born of its
inevitable presence within our politics, and does not derive from some
mystical authority enjoyed by dead super-majorities or supermen.
That does not mean history should play no role in constitutional inter-
pretation. It can, for example, serve as the source of useful political
theory (such as Madison's), cautionary lessons about human nature,
and information about the performance of political institutions. But
history must be handmaiden, not rival, to justice.
This auxiliary role no doubt will seem too modest to account for all
the history that goes into, for example, Supreme Court opinions.
23. Fortunately, the Framers included a preamble to the Second Amendment: "A
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. amend. II (empha-
sis added). They even had the sense, thank goodness, to refer to "well regulated"
militias, thereby leaving Timothy McVeigh and his buddies out in the cold. Id. (em-
phasis added). It is at least arguable that the only "gun rights" protected by the Sec-
ond Amendment are those that in fact support "the security of a free State"-and
that might mean none at all. Id. For further discussion, see Levinson, supra note 16,
at 643-45.
24. The constitutional text explicitly provides: "The enumeration in the Constitu-
tion, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people." U.S. Const. amend. IX. For perceptive commentaries arguing that the
Ninth Amendment ought to be taken more seriously, see generally Sotirios A. Bar-
ber, The Ninth Amendment Inkblot or Another Hard Nut to Crack?, 64 Chi.-Kent L
Rev. 67 (1988) (arguing for a liberal reading of the Ninth Amendment) and Lawrence
G. Sager, You Can Raise the Firs Hide Behind the Fourth, and Plead the Fifth. But
What on Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amendment?, 64 Chi.-Kent L Rev. 239
(1988) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment plays an important role in constitutional
interpretation).
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And, to some extent, it is; there is too much history in constitutional
interpretation as it is practiced today. Some of the excess is a direct
consequence of the Dead Hand Fallacy, as judges and scholars remain
in the grip of originalist or other confusions. Some of it results from
another, even worse phenomenon related to the Aesthetic Fallacy:
namely, the undignified and indefensible attempt by judges, scholars,
and lawyers to lord it over their fellow Americans by harmonizing
obscure details gathered from distant corners of the constitutional tra-
dition-something along the lines of, "So, Mr.-or-Ms.-ordinary-citi-
zen-or-politician, you think you know something about justice? Well,
I happen to have a quote here from John Rawls, and I can reconcile it
with a snippet from the private letters of Gouverneur Morris, five
cases from the Waite Court, and an obscure passage from Coke on
Littleton. Can you? Well, then, who's the real expert on justice?" I
do not think this tack is deliberately or self-consciously adopted (and,
of course, it is never so explicit or so rude as the quotation I have
concocted), but I do think it is quite common, and we would be better
off were it less so.25
Nevertheless, I believe there is a reason why history might legiti-
mately figure much more prominently in judicial interpretations of the
Constitution than it does in, say, political science analyses of Ameri-
can government. The point of judicial opinions is not merely to select
an interpretation but to persuade people that it is correct. Professor
Rakove suggests that we should sometimes regard judicial appeals to
history "not as the reasons driving decisions, but as an attractive rhe-
torical method of reassuring citizens that courts are acting consistently
with deeply held values."26 I think that courts write more to persuade
themselves, and other lawyers, than they do to reassure citizens;
judges need most of all to convince themselves and their colleagues
that they have the authority and the responsibility to stand up for
what they believe is right.27 With that modification, however, Profes-
sor Rakove's suggestion is very much on target. History serves a spe-
cific and indispensable rhetorical role: It reconciles the American
faith in popular sovereignty with the justice-seeking Constitution.
25. For criticism of this sort of technical showmanship in Supreme Court opinions,
see Eisgruber, Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 12, at 84-98 (describing textualist
and common law "interpretive fetishes").
26. Rakove, Fidelity Through History, supra note 3, at 1591.
27. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?,
67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 961, 1008-10 (1992) [hereinafter Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an
Educative Institution?]. There, I suggest that students, especially law students, are the
most important audience for the educative component of judicial opinions. Id. As I
indicate in the text, I am now inclined to modify this claim; in addition to its longer-
term effects, judicial rhetoric has an important role to play in convincing judges-
including, perhaps, the author of the opinion himself or herself!-to stand up for their
convictions. These convictions, I should add, may include convictions about the insti-
tutional role of the judiciary: So sometimes the role of judicial rhetoric may be to
convince judges that they must uphold laws they abhor.
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The idea that the people are the ultimate repository of political au-
thority is-patent both in American history and in the text of the Con-
stitution." It raises, as Edmund S. Morgan has pointed out, "a
continuing problem of authentication."'29 Government officials, in-
cluding judges, must claim to act on the people's behalf, but every
official necessarily traces her commission to acts by other officials,
whose own claims to speak for the people might be cast in doubt. As
Morgan says, "The people... [are] almost as hard to approach as
God. Individual people or groups of people... [can] be seen, heard,
touched, smelled, and... act, do things, and cause a lot of trouble, but
the people, in the sense of all those who were to be governed and
[those] who could authorize government, [can]not."' °
We might suppose that one can best recognize the sovereign people
through a substantive test: What the people really want is justice and
good government, and so the truest representatives of the people are
the ones who advance these objectives. These propositions are philo-
sophically and empirically contestable, but they are axiomatic to de-
mocracy: It is politically impossible to tell the people that they want
injustice or bad government. "By their fruits you shall know them,"
we might say; it turns out that popular sovereignty and divine author-
ity have more in common than one might at first imagine.
Nevertheless, precisely because of the difference between the peo-
ple and God, this approach to popular sovereignty depends upon his-
torical support. To quote Morgan once more, "the people have always
seemed to be a good deal more tangible than God; and a government
that claimed to act in their name had to present a plausible claim to
their approval, a claim plausible enough to persuade actual people to
submit."'" A judge, or anybody else who claims to act on the people's
behalf, will need some evidence that actual people-the kind who
vote, shout, and generally make trouble-want her to make the judg-
ments she enforces.
And that is where history enters the picture. The judge can rein-
force her conviction that the people want justice by pointing to histori-
cal figures or institutions that might plausibly, perhaps only with the
benefit of hindsight, be considered especially faithful representatives
of the people. When a judge uses history in this rhetorical way, she
inverts originalism's connection between legal determinacy and histor-
ical determinacy. Originalism supposes that historical facts can be
used to select among multiple, competing interpretations of the Con-
28. The preamble, of course, begins, "We the People ... ." U.S. Const. pmbl. For
nuanced discussion, see William F. Harris H, The Interpretable Constitution 74-78
(1993).
29. Edmund S. Morgan, The Fiction of "The People," N.Y. Rev. Books, Apr. 23,
1992, at 46, 46 (reviewing Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991)).
30. Id. I have changed the quote from the past tense to the present; hence the
elisions and brackets.
31. Id.
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stitution. The rhetorical treatment of popular sovereignty uses con-
clusions about constitutional justice to select among multiple,
competing interpretations of American history.32
It is worth asking, I think, whether constitutional interpreters are
better understood as engaging in this kind of rhetorical enterprise
when they say that they are offering an originalist interpretation of the
Constitution. The rhetorical account would explain why originalists
often disregard ambiguities in the historical record;33 why they always
seem to reach conclusions consistent with their own convictions about
constitutional justice;34 and why they are, as Professor Rakove notes,
apparently uninterested in advancing serious justifications for
originalism. 35
I do not mean to suggest that originalists would embrace my recon-
struction of their practice. They, or at least many of them, genuinely
believe that the historical arguments they make are the reasons they
have for their legal conclusions. If they were to admit that originalism
was a rhetorical strategy, not an interpretive strategy, they would have
to produce other reasons to justify their conclusions. They might also
want to reconfigure their historical stories, since they would no longer
have to protect the illusion of a completely determinate historical
record.
Originalist academics face an additional challenge. Judicial opin-
ions have a legitimate rhetorical function to play, but it is doubtful
whether the same thing can be said about law review articles. The
scholar's job is to analyze which arguments are better or worse, not to
inspire good works or make political myths. Much of the history that
32. I have already quoted Professor Rakove's mischievous admission that he likes
"originalist arguments when the weight of the evidence seems to support the constitu-
tional outcomes [he] favor[s]." Rakove, Original Meanings, supra note 1, at xv n.*.
This selective embrace of historical arguments would be illegitimate, of course, if one
supposed that history were the ground for determining what constitutional outcomes
ought to be favored. But if history's principal point is rhetorical, to support outcomes
that ought to be favored on different grounds, then Professor Rakove's attitude is
entirely appropriate.
33. See, e.g., id. at 11 ("[T]he Supreme Court's use of originalist evidence is best
described as a mix of 'law office history' and justificatory rhetoric which offers little
reason to think that this method of interpretation can provide the faithful and accu-
rate application of the original constitutional understandings its advocates promise.");
id. at 340 ("Nothing in [Robert] Bork's own principal defense of originalism suggests
that he has ever tested his thesis against [the] evidence . . ").
34. I discuss this point at greater length in Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright
Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming Apr. 1997). Cf
Rakove, Original Meanings, supra note 1, at xv n.* ("I happen to like originalist argu-
ments when the weight of the evidence seems to support the constitutional outcomes I
favor-and that may be as good a clue to the appeal of originalism as any other."
(emphasis added)).
35. Rakove, Fidelity Through History, supra note 3, at 1593 ("One curious feature
of the ongoing debate over originalism is that its critics have examined its premises far
more seriously than its advocates (for whom its appeal sometimes seems to rest on a
statement of faith).").
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suffuses judicial opinions is irrelevant to the questions that constitu-
tional scholars usually discuss. History cannot prove that the sover-
eign people want justice; that conclusion is, in my view, a necessary
component of the theory of popular sovereignty? 6 Nor does history
determine the right answer to constitutional questions, except in lim-
ited ways (e.g., by providing useful information about the competence
and performance of American political institutions).
It would, however, be perfectly permissible for academics to ask a
different question: What would a good judicial opinion look like in a
particular kind of constitutional controversy? The best opinions
would, presumably, not only reach the correct result but also do so
persuasively. To evaluate judicial opinions, academics would have to
comment upon which uses of history were more or less persuasive.
Historical arguments become unpersuasive if they are demonstrably
false, and so scholars should insist, as Professor Rakove does, that
constitutional interpreters be faithful to history if they make historical
arguments at all.
Academic commentary on constitutional opinions has for some
time proceeded as though the quality of an opinion were entirely a
function of its analytic rigor. The interest in the rhetorical features of
judicial opinions seems, however, to be growing.37 If, as I have sug-
36. Of course, my view of popular sovereignty is controversial. One might instead
adopt a procedural definition of "the people" and use it to identify the popular sover-
eign on some basis other than the quality of the sovereign's views. Bruce Ackerman's
theory is, I think, a sophisticated exercise of this kind; the theory is designed to iden-
tify "the people" by searching for appropriately engaged majorities. See Bruce Acker-
man, We the People: Foundations 6-7, 266-94 (1991) (summarizing the conditions
under which "higher lawmaking" occurs).
I believe that all such theories are unsatisfactory. Once one reduces "the people"
to a majority of the people-no matter how engaged or complex the majority-it
becomes impossible (in my view) to explain why popular sovereignty is attractive
from the standpoint of justice. The appeal of popular sovereignty depends upon the
idea that whole people govern, and that idea is compromised if, in fact, majorities
govern at the expense of minorities. Harris, supra note 28, at 77, 116-17 n.5; Christo-
pher L. Eisgruber, Ethnic Segregation by Religion and Race: Reflections on Kiryas
Joel and Shaw v. Reno, 26 Cumb. L. Rev. 515, 516-17 (1995-96).
In this regard, I part company with Professor Sager's argument in The Incorrigible
Constitution. In that article, Professor Sager opposed his justice-seeking view of the
Constitution to "popular sovereignty" views. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution,
supra note 7, at 897 ("[O]ur constitutional tradition cannot plausibly be squared with
the absolutism of popular sovereignty, and we should abandon the effort."). I think
that popular sovereignty is so ingrained in the constitutional text and in American
history that we must respect it. Sager's real complaint, in my view, is with procedural
conceptions of "the people," not with the ultimate sovereignty of "the people."
37. My own contributions to the study of judicial rhetoric include Eisgruber, Is the
Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, supra note 27 and Christopher L Eisgruber,
John Marshall's Judicial Rhetoric, 1996 Sup. Ct. Rev. (forthcoming 1997). A seminal
work in the field is James B. White, When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions
and Reconstitutions of Language, Character, and Community (1984). For further
reading, see also Favorite Case Symposium, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1195 (1996) and Special
Issue: Judicial Opinion Writing, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1363 (1995).
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gested, originalism is best understood as a rhetorical strategy, then
this relatively junior branch of constitutional studies may in fact em-
brace a much greater portion of the discipline than has been thought.
CONCLUSION
When the Constitution's anti-federalist critics demanded a Bill of
Rights, Alexander Hamilton predicted that the change would do more
harm than good. According to Hamilton, the Constitution did not au-
thorize the government to compromise the rights of persons. Includ-
ing a Bill of Rights would mislead people into thinking that the
government had powers it did not. People would mistakenly come to
believe that the government was free to compromise rights not speci-
fied in the Constitution.3"
Conventional wisdom treats Hamilton's stance as a blunder. The
United States enacted the Bill of Rights and tacked on the Ninth
Amendment to deflate Hamilton's objection. The Bill of Rights is
now regarded as the fountainhead for a grand and glorious jurispru-
dence of civil liberties. Hamilton's argument is an archaic curiosity
good only for teasing law students and showing that even the Framers
sometimes got it wrong.
In fact, Hamilton was quite right and this Symposium is proof of his
insight. The Bill of Rights has combined with the Dead Hand Fallacy
and the Aesthetic Fallacy to spawn the peculiar notion that "fidelity"
to the Constitution compels us to insist upon something less than fair
measure when we assess the government's constitutional obligation to
liberty, equality, or justice.39 "Fidelity," in other words, has become a
shorthand for the idea that government can excuse its failure to pro-
tect rights by pointing to loopholes in the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, efforts to give exact definition to this concept of
fidelity have been politically charged and conceptually unsatisfactory.
That is not because the answers have been poor but because the ques-
tion is wrong. We should give up thinking that fidelity to the Consti-
tution comes at the expense of justice; rather, we should realize that
fidelity to the Constitution, if defensible at all, means fidelity to jus-
tice,40 and history matters to constitutional interpretation only as the
servant of justice.
38. The Federalist No. 84, at 513-14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
39. I say fair measure, not full measure, in order to take into account institutional
constraints and other practical concerns that might legitimately dissuade a judiciary
from enforcing perfect compliance with moral principles. See Lawrence G. Sager, Fair
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev.
1212, 1212 (1978). As I have already noted, some conceptions of political justice may
recommend a very limited role for the judiciary. See supra note 22.
40. See Barber, On What the Constitution Means, supra note 19, at 11 (arguing
that "difficult constitutional questions should be resolved in ways that contribute to
some picture or notion of the just and good society").
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